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Historically, toxicology has played a significant role in verifying
conclusions drawn on the basis of epidemiological findings. Agents
that were suggested to have a role in human diseases have been tested
in animals to firmly establish a causative link. Bacterial pathogens are
perhaps the oldest examples, and tobacco smoke and lung cancer and
asbestos and mesothelioma provide two more recent examples. With
the advent of toxicity testing guidelines and protocols, toxicology took
on a role that was intended to anticipate or predict potential adverse
effects in humans, and epidemiology, in many cases, served a role in
verifying or negating these toxicological predictions. The coupled role
of epidemiology and toxicology in discerning human health effects by
environmental agents is obvious, but there is currently no systematic
and transparent way to bring the data and analysis of the two dis-
ciplines together in a way that provides a unified view on an adverse
causal relationship between an agent and a disease. In working to
advance the interaction between the fields of toxicology and epi-
demiology, we propose here a five-step ‘‘Epid-Tox’’ process that would
focus on: (1) collection of all relevant studies, (2) assessment of their
quality, (3) evaluation of the weight of evidence, (4) assignment of
a scalable conclusion, and (5) placement on a causal relationship grid.
The causal relationship grid provides a clear view of how epidemiolog-
ical and toxicological data intersect, permits straightforward conclu-
sions with regard to a causal relationship between agent and effect, and
can show how additional data can influence conclusions of causality.
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THE INTERSECTION OF EPIDEMIOLOGY
AND TOXICOLOGY
In 1775, Percivall Pott concluded, on the basis of clinical
observations, that scrotal cancer in chimney sweeps was caused
by chimney soot (Potter, 1962). It was almost 140 years before
experimental confirmation of this was produced by Yamagiwa
and Ichikawa (1918). By repeated painting of rabbit ears with
a coal tar extract, they produced epithelial skin tumors,
powerfully corroborating what Pott had seen in humans. In
this case, an inference of causation in humans was arrived at
through a combination of the two scientific disciplines.
Subsequently, animal studies were used to verify other
epidemiological findings, serving to establish Koch’s third
postulate: the agent should cause the disease when introduced
into a healthy organism (Koch, 1884, 1893). Although Koch’s
original intent was proving disease causation by microbiolog-
ical pathogens, this third postulate has also been applied to
corroborating chemical-related epidemiological findings in
humans, by testing in animals.
Although there are a number of examples of how epidemiology
and toxicology intersected over time, perhaps the most notable
case is tobacco smoke and lung cancer. By 1964, there was ample
epidemiological evidence for a causal connection between lung
cancer and smoking tobacco products; at that point, the U.S.
Surgeon General (Bayne-Jones et al., 1964) accepted the
relationship as causal. Yet at that time, toxicologists could not
reproduce similar tumors in animal models. This lack of
concordance emphasized the difficulty of using Koch’s postulates
that were established for infectious disease in chemical-related
pathogenesis. Toxicological corroboration of epidemiological
evidence later became the element of ‘‘biological plausibility’’ in
Hill’s guidelines for establishing causality (Hill, 1965). Hill and
others (Bayne-Jones et al., 1964) effectively modified Koch’s
third postulate from an orientation of proof to one of plausibility.
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Whereas the concordance was high between cancer-causing
agents initially discovered in humans and positive results in
animal studies (Tomatis et al., 1989; Wilbourn et al., 1984), the
same could not be said for the reverse relationship: carcinogenic
effects in animals frequently lacked concordance with overall
patterns in human cancer incidence (Pastoor and Stevens, 2005).
This lack of concordance between toxicology and epidemiology
might arise because the high doses used in animal studies to
produce tumors are not typically seen in human populations.
Nonetheless, toxicology took on a predictive rather than
a confirmatory role by providing alerts for potential effects in
humans, whether carcinogenic, neurotoxic, hepatotoxic, or any
other adverse outcome. These alerts became the basis for
regulating chemical exposure to humans. The underlying
assumption was that restricting exposure well below levels at
which adverse effects were seen in animals would prevent
harmful outcomes in humans.
Thus, the relationship between epidemiology and toxicology
has shifted over time. Both disciplines seek to contribute data
relating to the causes of human disease and occasionally lean
on each other to support propositions of causality. Toxicolo-
gists and epidemiologists alike spend considerable time and
effort characterizing the relationship between the putative
causal agent and a response (Fig. 1). Many of the same
fundamental considerations are part of the evidence-based
analysis that takes place by scientists in the two disciplines.
However, the two fields could arguably be said to work in
parallel rather than in concert. Can toxicological experimen-
tation augment a weak positive epidemiological finding?
Conversely, when and how does low biological plausibility
influence a positive epidemiological finding? Separately, the
fields can derive conclusions based on paradigms illustrated in
Figure 1. Together, conclusions of causality can be more firmly
based, further investigations can be clearly identified, and
improvements in human health protection can be achieved. In
addition to highlighting the history of relevant developments in
the fields, we suggest a way that the two disciplines can come
together to better understand the impact, potential or real, of
agents on human health.
CAUSAL INFERENCE
Process for Causal Inference
The disciplines of toxicology and epidemiology ask the
question: can a substance cause a particular effect in humans.
The data obtained in toxicological and epidemiological studies
do not always lead to a straightforward interpretation, and often
different observers will differ in their conclusions. Even for
associations that are widely regarded as causal today—such as
ingestion of water contaminated with the bacterium Vibrio
cholerae and the incidence of cholera or cigarette smoking and
the incidence of lung cancer—for some years after relevant
data became available, there was considerable disagreement as
to the presence of a cause-effect relation in each instance.
Indeed, a principle underlying the philosophy of science is that
causality cannot be ‘‘proven’’; it can only be inferred with
different degrees of certainty.
Epidemiological investigation of a null hypothesis that
postulates that a variable has no effect on a health outcome can
never be established to be true (Popper, 1959); there can only
be a failure to show that the null hypothesis is false within the
FIG. 1. Contribution of toxicology and epidemiology data to causal inference. Many of the same principles contribute to evidence-based decisions in the two
fields. Together, causation can be more accurately inferred.
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limits of specific study designs. Theories that integrate
observations from multiple studies, or rely on other biological
considerations, are useful when they make testable predictions.
Hypotheses that are not testable do not fall within the realm of
science. Likewise, expert opinion should be supported by
evidence for rational science-based decision making (Guzelian
et al., 2005).
Because Hill (1965) and others (Bayne-Jones et al., 1964)
articulated their perspectives on causal inference, scientists
have further described methods to systematically review and
characterize the evidence that might be used to support an
inference of causality (Cole, 1997; ECETOC, 2009; Kundi,
2007; Phillips and Goodman, 2004; Rothman 1976; Rothman
and Greenland, 2005; Susser, 1986; Weed, 2005). We suggest
an expert judgment process for integrating the totality of the
epidemiological findings in a weight of evidence framework.
This integration takes note of the literature cited above but
extends this thinking by offering a method to systematically
consider biological plausibility and epidemiological evidence
in a process to unite epidemiology and toxicology in
a framework to infer causality.
Applications of Causal Inference in Epidemiology
Epidemiological studies document the occurrence of illness
or injury in human populations. Depending on the design,
epidemiological studies can provide evidence bearing on
a causal relationship. For example, quantification of the
efficacy of pharmaceutical agents in humans is often based
on randomized controlled studies, where ‘‘exposed’’ and
‘‘nonexposed’’ persons are similar with regard to other
characteristics that bear on the outcome in question. However,
the focus of this paper is on causal inference for environmental
agents (primarily synthetic chemicals). Because randomized
trials with environmental agents are rarely feasible or perhaps
ethical, this study design will not be discussed here.
Studies aimed at evaluating environmental chemicals and
other environmental factors are generally nonrandomized
observational studies with an ecologic, case-control, or cohort
design. Although these studies are fundamental in gauging
possible human health effects, their design may limit the extent
to which inferences about causality can be drawn. Because
observational studies do not randomly allocate subjects to
exposure, interpretation of the results of these studies must take
into account any differences, or the possibility of differences,
between exposed and nonexposed subjects. A brief description
of these observational studies and their strengths and weak-
nesses follows.
Ecologic Studies Ecologic studies contrast the incidence of
disease across populations (or population subgroups) that differ
in terms of presence or degree of an exposure to an
environmental factor. The incidence of disease among different
population subgroups may be evaluated on the basis of, for
example, geographical differences or changes in disease
incidence over time within a population.
Ecologic studies have the potential to contribute to our
understanding of exposure-disease relationships if . . .
the environmental exposure level can be ascertained with
reliability,
there are large differences in exposure,
the incidence of the disease is ascertained in a comparable
manner, and
there is little or no difference in the presence of other causes of
the disease.
For example, aflatoxin (a toxic product of Aspergillus flavus)
was found early on in experimental evaluations in animals to be
an extremely potent carcinogen. At that time, the only relevant
data in humans took the form of correlations of liver cancer
mortality rates across population groups with marked differ-
ences in estimated aflatoxin intake. The positive correlation
observed in these studies was open to alternative interpreta-
tions—the populations with the highest rates differed in ways
other than exposure to aflatoxin such as the prevalence of
Hepatitis B infection—so it was largely the strength of the
laboratory evidence that served as a basis for a tentative causal
inference. Later, stronger epidemiologic data became available
supporting a causal effect. In particular, there were ecologic
studies with less potential for confounding and nested case-
control studies in which prediagnosis urinary markers of
aflatoxin intake could be assessed (Qian et al., 1994; Wang
et al., 1996).
In practice, causal inferences that can be drawn from the
results of ecologic studies may be limited because:
Within a given population, exposure characterization may
not have been carried out (or carried out well and in a similar
way) over time or among population subgroups. Furthermore,
within a population, the actual variation in exposure levels may
be small, making it difficult for an epidemiological study to
reliably document the differences in occurrence of disease. The
weaker the association, the more difficult it is to distinguish it
from an association that arises by chance or confounding.
The completeness of ascertainment of the disease condition
can vary by place and time. This is particularly a problem for
a condition in which diagnostic criteria are difficult to apply
consistently (e.g., autism, Parkinson’s disease, non-Hodgkin
lymphoma) but can also be present when differential disease
screening occurs as a function of location and time (e.g.,
prostate specific antigen testing for prostate cancer).
In order to maximize the contrast in exposure prevalence or
levels across geographic units, many ecologic studies compare
disparate geographic populations for disease occurrence. For
example, most ecologic studies that have examined the
association between dietary fat and breast cancer incidence
have compared national populations from around the world
where data on both diet and cancer incidence were available.
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This approach allowed for the inclusion of populations in
which a variety of dietary intakes was present but made it
difficult to interpret whether the association seen (i.e., higher
fat intake associated with higher breast cancer incidence) was
because of the dietary differences in fat intake or to differences
in one or more of the other characteristics of these populations.
The absence of a relationship between dietary fat and breast
cancer incidence was suggested by the results of cohort studies
where little or no association between dietary fat intake and
breast cancer risk was observed among individuals within
certain populations (Hunter et al., 1996). These data argue that
the strong positive association observed in ecologic studies was
in fact a reflection of the confounding influence of one or more
characteristics that were associated with both diet and breast
cancer risk (Colditz et al., 2006).
Case-Control Studies Case-control studies ascertain the
proportion of persons who previously experienced one or more
exposures among persons with a disease (cases) and a sample
of persons representative of the person-time from which the
cases were generated (controls).
Exposure ascertainment is a potential source of bias in case-
control studies, notably in studies investigating environmental
exposures because they may be incompletely or inaccurately
reported or recorded and misclassification may vary by case-
control status. Thus, the results can indicate either spuriously
high or spuriously low estimates of the magnitude of any
association. Direct measurements of blood or tissue levels of
chemical exposures (or metabolites of these chemicals)
obtained after diagnosis in the cases may not reflect earlier
levels of exposure because the illness and its treatment may
have led to an alteration in these levels. Even if exposure levels
of cases were unaffected by disease status among cases, the
levels measured at the time of the study may not be indicative
of those present earlier in life when critical pathogenic events
occurred.
Unless a case-control study can overcome the difficulties of
valid retrospective ascertainment of exposure status, it cannot
be confidently relied upon to provide a valid estimate of the
association between an exposure and a disease. Cross-sectional
studies, in which current exposure levels are compared between
persons with and without a given condition at the time of the
assessment of the exposure (irrespective of when that condition
first developed), are particularly problematic in this regard.
In unusual circumstances—when the proportion of ill
individuals with a history of a given exposure far exceeds
what might be expected—an association can be inferred
without the need for a formal control group. For example,
because all cases of a form of pneumonia in an area of Spain
during a relatively short period of time reported ingestion of
adulterated rapeseed oil (Tabuenca, 1981), it was reasonable to
infer a causal connection (and to take preventive action) prior
to the enrollment of controls into this study.
Cohort Studies It often happens that the same chemicals to
which one or more communities are exposed also are
encountered in persons who work in the manufacture or
distribution of these chemicals. Because these exposures tend
to be higher than those received in a community at large, any
impact on disease risk from exposure to the agent is likely to be
greater in magnitude in the exposed workforce and therefore
easier to ascertain in an epidemiologic study.
Because it is often possible to identify workforce members
and monitor their status through vital records and disease
registers, epidemiologic studies based on the workers’
experience are feasible. The results of occupational cohort
studies can nevertheless be difficult to interpret because of the
presence of multiple chemical exposures on the job and,
particularly in retrospective cohort studies, difficulties in
accounting for prior work history and other disease-causing
exposures not ascertained in available records such as smoking
history. Nonetheless, occupational cohort studies have contrib-
uted a great deal to our understanding of health effects of
chemical exposures and, when available, can assume a prom-
inent place in the evaluation of the safety of exposure to
chemicals.
Applications of Causal Inference in Toxicology
In toxicology, the test agent is given to the animal or in vitro
cellular system under clearly defined exposure conditions (e.g.,
oral, dermal, inhalation; gavage, diet; short term, long term,
etc.). The physiological status of each test group is compared
with the untreated group. From this body of data, a toxicologist
must then decide which responses are exposure related and
determine whether the responses observed are relevant to
humans. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
toxicologist assumes that findings in animals are likely to be
relevant to human health.
However, as our understanding of biological systems has
evolved, we realize that effects in animals may not be relevant
to humans. The need for this important distinction depends on
either qualitative differences in biology or quantitative differ-
ences between animals and humans in the kinetics of the
chemical or the dynamics of the response.
A systematic way of drawing conclusions of human
relevance (causality) was first proposed by the International
Programme on Chemical Safety (Sonich-Mullin et al., 2001)
and later expanded substantially with the development of
frameworks for evaluating the human relevance of mode of
action (MoA) in experimental animals for carcinogens (Boobis
et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2003; Klaunig et al., 2003, Meek
et al., 2003) and for noncancer effects (Boobis et al., 2008;
Seed et al., 2005). Julien et al. (2009) carried this concept one
step further and proposed the key events dose-response
framework (KEDRF). KEDRF is a step-wise decision-logic
process that provides a foundation for more rigorous and
quantitative descriptions of dose-response.
226 ADAMI ET AL.
The essential form of MoA analysis asks three questions to
establish the likelihood of a chemical’s potential effect on
humans (Fig. 2):
1) Is there sufficient evidence in animal studies to establish
a MoA?
2) If so, is that mode of action operative in humans? and
3) If so—considering pharmacokinetic and dynamic
characteristics—would the MoA be operative in humans?
If the answer is YES to all three questions, then the effect
seen in animals could plausibly occur in humans. Likewise, if
the MoA is considered to be not relevant to humans, then the
biological plausibility of the effect being observed in humans
through the proposed MoA is highly unlikely.
THE EPID-TOX FRAMEWORK
In one of the initial essays that wrestled with the bases for
inferences of the causes of disease, Hill (1965) concluded that
it is not possible to ‘‘lay down some hard-and-fast rules of
evidence that must be obeyed before we accept cause and
effect.’’ In practice, tentative inference regarding the presence
or absence of a causal relation between exposure and disease is
made through a subjective process in which one considers
which of the indicated features are present and, in particular,
the degree to which they are present. Occasionally, the process
is straightforward—all the evidence supports a causal hypoth-
esis—and nearly everyone who addresses the issue arrives at
the same conclusion, for example, that cigarette smoke is
a cause of lung cancer. The evidence is considered ‘‘conclu-
sive’’; causation is viewed as ‘‘definitely present.’’
A similar conclusion occasionally can be reached when the
epidemiologic data are overwhelming, even without supporting
evidence from other medical disciplines. For example, the
extremely strong association seen in epidemiologic studies
between aspirin use and Reye’s syndrome, combined with the
absence of any similar association with the use of other
analgesics (Halpin et al., 1982; Hurwitz and Schonberger,
1987; Forsyth et al., 1989), served as a solid basis for
discouraging aspirin use in children, even without any precise
knowledge at that time of how aspirin might have caused
a child with flu or chicken pox to develop this illness.
In other instances, little or no evidence suggests causation,
such as in the published literature relating exposure to magnetic
fields and the occurrence of cancer. In this case, it is likely that
most groups of experts would conclude that there is no
evidence for an etiologic connection between exposure to mag-
netic fields and cancer in adults, that is, there is ‘‘no evidence
supporting causality.’’ Because it is not possible to rule out
a weak effect of exposure on disease incidence, it is not sur-
prising that some debate continues regarding the safety of
exposure to magnetic fields.
These instances of varied information from toxicology and
epidemiology argue for a systematic approach that brings
comprehensive, disciplined thinking into a complete and
rational evaluation of the evidence. Such a systematic treatment
lays on the table the complete story and gives practitioners
a way to point to specific gaps in knowledge or lapses in logic
based on the totality of information.
Overall, the Epid-Tox Framework follows a series of steps
that assesses an explicit effect such as a specific cancer,
neurological disease, or any tissue or system-specific adverse
effect. The following steps would be to:
1) collect all relevant studies (toxicology and epidemiology),
2) assess the quality of each study and assign it to a quality
category,
3) evaluate the epidemiological and toxicological weight of
the evidence,
4) assign a scalable conclusion to the biological plausibility
(toxicological) and epidemiological evidence, and
5) determine placement in a causal relationship grid.
Collect All Relevant Studies
This may be too obvious, but a serious source of bias is the
selective collection of studies. A comprehensive search for all
studies relevant to the end point in question should be
conducted and documented as part of the process. This step
is meant to be as inclusive as possible, bearing in mind that the
process begins with a specific question: does agent X cause
effect Y? All studies that offer data should be included at this
point. One problem that continues to plague both toxicology and
epidemiology is the nonpublication of ‘‘negative’’ studies wherein
no effects were seen and investigators and journals are reluctant to
publish such information. Nonetheless, no-effect studies are an
important part of the total available data set and their absence
biases the overall judgment in favor of studies showing effects.
FIG. 2. Steps 1 and 2 of the Epid-Tox framework: study identification and
quality categorization.
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Assess Quality and Categorize
Both kinds of studies, in epidemiology and toxicology, may
present the observer with a wide range of investigations carried
out in variable ways, with differing entry or exclusion criteria,
variable ascertainment of effects, a range of exposures or
exposure estimations, and observational endpoints. No study
should be excluded at this stage of consideration. Having
collected all available studies, each study should be included or
excluded by using a transparent rationale. Both disciplines
have generally accepted criteria for assessing study quality.
Toxicology The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(USEPA) developed quality criteria that are typically applied in
the evaluation of studies submitted for regulatory purposes.
Various terms have been used to describe a study’s suitability,
relevance, conduct, and how well the study satisfies the intent
of a particular guideline (USEPA, 1993), including ‘‘core
guideline,’’ ‘‘core minimum,’’ ‘‘core supplementary,’’ or ‘‘in-
valid.’’ Core guideline indicates an acceptable study, whereas
core minimum indicates that ‘‘while some things are missing,
the study still fulfills the guideline requirements.’’ Core
supplementary has been used to identify studies with ‘‘. . .
a significant deficiency or that additional information is
required.’’ Terms have changed over the years to ‘‘Acceptable’’
and ‘‘Unacceptable,’’ with additional statements as to whether
a study is upgradable to Acceptable status (USEPA, 2001). For
the purpose of the Epid-Tox framework, the extremes of
Acceptable and Unacceptable are useful categories. There are
clearly going to be well done studies with verifiable
conclusions and on the other hand studies with inapplicable
methods, inappropriate data, or unsubstantiated conclusions.
As well, an intermediate category is needed to categorize
studies that have deficiencies that render them less than fully
acceptable, but have sufficient quality that they cannot be
regarded as unacceptable. Thus, the suggested categories
include Acceptable, Supplemental, and Unacceptable (Fig. 3).
Epidemiology Similar to all scientific investigations, no
epidemiological study is perfect; all have limitations to some
extent. Nonetheless, experienced epidemiologists can evaluate
the strengths and weaknesses of individual studies and
categorize them as to whether they can be used to inform
a judgment regarding causality. ECETOC (2009) has an
excellent rendition of quality criteria that are based on elements
of study design, exposure information, and health effects data.
However, no objective, numerical yardstick exists to grade the
quality of epidemiology studies.
Certainly, there is a subjective element in the categorization
process. However, it is better to take a study’s quality into
account, acknowledging the imperfection of the process, than
to give each study an equal weight. How this is done might
vary from investigator to investigator, but in any case, the
process of quality categorization needs to be transparently
documented in the evaluation. What one investigator may find
to be an acceptable study might be rejected by another. The
value of this step in the Epid-Tox Framework is to fully reveal
and document not just the investigator’s quality categorization
but the reason for drawing a particular conclusion.
Documentation of these evaluation and categorization
decisions can be provided in narrative form for individual
studies. Study attributes to be considered include—but may not
necessarily be limited to—the number of subjects, the range of
exposure levels among these persons, study enrollment
methodology, disease and exposure ascertainment methods,
range of exposure, potential information bias, identification and
measurement of potential confounders, and statistical method-
ology used to assess associations and to control for
confounders.
As more reports of epidemiology studies include a complete
description of the design and analytic methods used, the
information needed to perform a quality assessment will be
more readily available. A report checklist was developed by
von Elm et al. (2007) for observational studies, known as the
‘‘Strobe statement,’’ and serves as a method to evaluate the
quality of reporting of a study. In a similar initiative, the London
Principles for Epidemiology itemized the attributes that char-
acterize well-conducted observational epidemiological studies
(Graham, 1995; London Principles, 1996).
However, it might be measured, the quality of epidemio-
logical studies will likely be distributed from useful to useless.
For practical purposes, studies can be put into discrete
categories of quality similar to those used for toxicology
studies. Studies that are well designed, relatively free of bias,
and have adequate control of known confounders are classified
as Acceptable. Supplemental studies would have more serious
imperfections and be of lesser quality but still be useable.
Unacceptable studies would fail to meet several or all of the
quality criteria and would not be used in subsequent steps in
the evaluation (Fig. 3).
Evaluate the Weight of Evidence
Toxicology With all Acceptable and Supplemental studies
at hand, the question is asked, ‘‘Is the effect of interest
present.’’ If there is evidence for a specific effect in some or all
animal studies, the next stage in the evaluation is to use MoA
analysis to determine human relevance (Fig. 2). If the answer to
all three MoA Framework questions is ‘‘yes,’’ then the effect is
considered plausible to occur in humans. If the specific effect
of interest is absent from the animal studies or the effect is
present but judged by MoA analysis to be not relevant to
human health, then the effect is concluded to have low
biological plausibility to occur in humans.
Epidemiology Based on the evaluation of the complete set
of studies categorized as Acceptable or Supplemental,
a judgment is made as to whether or not there is an association
between an agent and a given disease in humans as well as the
strength of that association. This conclusion must be made
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from the totality of evidence and may require balancing
conflicting studies to produce one encompassing statement
about the epidemiological evidence.
Various approaches can be used to produce one encompass-
ing statement, including the systematic use of the Hill criteria
(Hill, 1965). But the essence of evaluating the weight of
evidence relies upon several central concepts. These include,
but are not limited to, an effect within and among the studies
that is found with strength, consistency, specificity, and
coherence (Cole, 1997; Lagiou et al., 2005). Whereas there
are currently no hard-and-fast systematic, numerical character-
izations that capture this expert judgment process, most
practitioners would acknowledge that faced with an array of
epidemiological studies, these concepts would guide their
judgment in deriving a reliable encompassing statement of
causal inference.
Assign a Scalable Conclusion
The ultimate value of the Epid-Tox Framework is to
determine the degree of strength or likelihood of the effect of
interest. Therefore, for both the epidemiological and toxico-
logical findings, there needs to be a semiquantitative conclu-
sion that states the degree to which the studies indicate
a positive, a negative, or no relationship.
At the beginning of any epidemiological or toxicological
evaluation, there has to be a starting point from which evidence
pushes a conclusion toward the existence or lack thereof of
causality. Starting at one end of a scale is not appropriate. Such
a starting point implies that as studies are accumulated,
a positive association will be identified when the reverse, a lack
of association, may also become increasingly plausible as
scientific evidence accumulates.
Therefore, the scaling of strength for an epidemiological or
toxicological evaluation begins at the center of the scale and,
depending on the presence or absence of the effect, the scaling
moves accordingly in the positive or negative direction. By
starting at the center of each scale (the middle of the grid),
evidence of absence can be distinguished from absence of
evidence for an association. For example, with few sufficient
quality epidemiology studies, one may have to state that there
is an absence of evidence to conclude one way or another that
there is a causal association. On the other hand, evidence for an
absence of an epidemiological relationship can take either of
two forms:
1) There may be a sufficient number of epidemiological
studies to conclude that an association does not exist. For
example, relative risks are around 1.0 and no statistical
differences are seen within the studies. There is, therefore,
evidence for an absence of an effect. As a consequence, the
scaling shifts toward the left, indicating that there is
epidemiological evidence ‘‘against’’ a causal link. With the
accumulation of more and more studies not showing a given
effect, the confidence for evidence against an association is
strengthened.
2) Along with data sets showing no association, there may
also be epidemiological data sets that actually indicate
a protective effect. In this case, relative risks would be less
than 1.0 and statistically significant.
FIG. 3. The human relevance mode of action framework.
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Determine Placement in a Causal Relationship Grid
Figure 4 shows the Epid-Tox graphical template for
establishing a causal relationship. Starting at the intersection
of the x- and y-axes (middle of graph), the degree of biological
plausibility (toxicology) is scaled on the y-axis and the degree
(weight) of epidemiological evidence on the x-axis. The
intersection of the toxicological and epidemiological scaling
leads to an appropriate, evidence-based conclusion regarding
causality.
The structure and appearance of the causal relationship
graphic is fundamental to ensuing decisions about causality.
Several factors led to the development of its form, including the
impact of the degree of ‘‘positive’’ or ‘‘negative’’ data and the
relative weighting of epidemiological studies versus toxico-
logical studies. At the beginning of any analysis, there may be
a dearth of either toxicological or epidemiological studies. In
such a case, where the scaling remains at or near the center
point, there is ‘‘insufficient information’’ to draw any
conclusions. Note that the area of insufficient information is
oblong and extended for the biological plausibility axis. The
reason is that animal studies require a greater degree of
evidence relative to epidemiology. Animal studies are
surrogates for actual human data and as such require higher
levels of evidence.
In addition, as more studies and information become
available, the scaling of either the toxicological plausibility
or epidemiological evidence can change in a way that can be
easily illustrated with the two-dimensional graphic.
At this point, the evaluator can clearly see where the
epidemiological and toxicological evidence intersects and,
based on that location on the graphic makes an overall
conclusion that starts with, ‘‘A causal relationship is . . .’’ and
completes the conclusion with words that describe the resultant
area. Short, descriptive phrases are used here, but the
underlying data and weight of evidence should be well
understood at this point. The categories are as given below.
Likely A causal relationship is ‘‘Likely’’ between the
environmental factor and the disease condition. This implies
that consistent, reliable evidence from epidemiological and
animal studies permits a causal inference to be made. Two
examples of this outcome are asbestos as a cause of
mesothelioma and tobacco smoke as a cause of lung cancer.
Uncertain A causal relationship is ‘‘Uncertain’’ between
the environmental factor and the disease condition. In this case,
there may be epidemiological evidence that can reasonably be
interpreted as indicating a causal link. However, there may be
little or no biological plausibility based on animal studies. Note
in the lower right-hand corner that the transition between
Likely and Uncertain favors epidemiological evidence. That is,
with a high degree of epidemiological evidence, significant,
and compelling data for a lack of biological plausibility must
exist to transition from Likely to Uncertain. This again stresses
the primacy of epidemiological evidence.
For example, Kaposi’s sarcoma, a normally rare tumor in
humans, showed such a remarkable increased incidence
following HIV infection (Sarid et al., 2002) that epidemiolog-
ical criteria for a causal relationship were met (Fig. 5).
However, at the time, no laboratory studies had verified the
pathogen. Therefore, the association was categorized as likely
but of low biological plausibility. Later, extensive laboratory
investigations led to the discovery of a specific herpes virus
(HHV8 or KSHV) that strengthened the inference of causality
because of an increased knowledge regarding a likely patho-
genesis of Kaposi’s sarcoma.
Based on some early suggestive results, a number of
epidemiologic studies have been done on the possible relation
between exposure to electromagnetic fields (EMF) and the
occurrence of brain cancer. The results from occupational
studies—which typically involve higher levels of exposure than
residential studies—have been summarized (Kheifets et al., 2008).
The relative risk associated with EMF exposure was statistically
significant (RR ¼ 1.14, 95% CI ¼ 1.07–1.22). The authors of the
review, however, concluded that ‘‘the lack of a clear pattern of
EMF exposure and outcome risk does not support a hypothesis that
these exposures were responsible for the excess risk.’’ Biological
plausibility is low in this example because ‘‘in vitro, in vivo, or
mechanistic evidence has not provided clues’’ as to a basis for an
association between exposure to EMF and the development of
brain cancer (Kheifets et al., 2009). As shown in Figure 5, the
initial analysis of epidemiological studies showed some evidence;
FIG. 4. The causal inference grid: how strong is the evidence for or against
a causal relationship in humans?
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however, in combination with low plausibility, the causal
relationship would be considered Uncertain. With time, more
recent studies—generally with relatively better exposure ascer-
tainment—tended to observe an even smaller association than did
earlier studies. The updated evaluation would move the
categorization from Uncertain to Unlikely.
Uncertain A causal relationship is ‘‘Uncertain’’ but plausible
between the environmental factor and the disease condition. In this
instance, the weight of evidence analysis of epidemiological studies
shows little or no evidence of any effect although toxicological
studies may indicate the plausibility of an effect in humans.
For example, as shown in Figure 6, melamine bladder and
kidney toxicity seen in animal studies was considered relevant to
human health, albeit only at very high exposures. But no
epidemiological evidence supported a causal relationship. An
initial evaluation placed melamine in this category (Uncertain
but plausible). However, the unfortunate incidents in China after
the adulteration of milk with melamine and resultant rise in the
number of children with melamine crystals detected in the
urinary bladder and death because of kidney damage confirmed
that the mode of action understood from animal models is
relevant to humans at high levels of exposure (World Health
Organization, 2009). This additional epidemiological evidence
moved the conclusion of causality from Uncertain to Likely.
Unlikely A causal relationship is ‘‘Unlikely’’ between the
environmental factor and the disease condition. Both epidemi-
ological and toxicological evidence is compatible with the
absence of effect.
For example, because D-limonene causes kidney toxicity
in male rats, the biological plausibility was high and, without
epidemiological evidence, would be considered Uncertain
but plausible (Fig. 6). Subsequent investigations showed that
D-limonene–induced kidney toxicity is not relevant to
humans (Swenberg and Lehman-McKeeman, 1999; Meek
et al., 2003), which moves the conclusion of a causal
relationship to the Unlikely category.
Another example, not shown on the grid, is phenobarbital.
Phenobarbital increased the incidence of liver tumors in long-
term rodent bioassays (Whysner et al., 1996) by a mode of
action that would be plausible in humans. Biological plausibility
would be considered high for phenobarbital. However, epide-
miological studies have found no evidence of liver tumors in
patients on lifetime anti-epilepsy treatment with phenobarbital
(IARC, 2001; Whysner et al., 1996). Without epidemiological
evidence, the categorization would be Likely or Uncertain, but
with sufficient epidemiological evidence for an absence of an
effect in humans, the categorization would be Unlikely.
As mentioned previously, a checkbox approach to charac-
terize the nature of the evidence that would lead an expert team
of epidemiologists and toxicologists to reach a weight of
evidence decision is not practical. However, the Epid-Tox
Framework described here and shown schematically in Figure
7 provides by structure and example a way of systematically
working through all evidence and reaching a conclusion that
can be tracked, debated, and modified with further data.
FUTURE NEEDS AND DIRECTIONS
The proposed new framework represents a concerted effort
to bridge the fields of epidemiology and toxicology in a way
that can impact, and hopefully improve, human risk
FIG. 5. Applications of the Epid-Tox framework: HIV/Kaposi’s sarcoma
and EMF and brain tumors.
FIG. 6. Applications of the Epid-Tox framework: melamine and
d-limonene.
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assessment. It will benefit from application and critique and
will undoubtedly require some modification. This formalized
set of steps, in and of itself, provides a structure for challenging
both disciplines and how they can and should be brought
together. Each step of the process invites improvement,
including the availability of studies, the determination of
quality, the proper metric for assigning the degree or strength
of evidence, and the appearance and utility of the two-
dimensional grid.
Availability of evidence will always be an Achilles Heel in any
evaluation that seeks scope and completeness. Unpublished data
that languish in the drawer or is only contained in official
submissions to regulatory agencies is an unfortunate omission that
currently is unavoidable. Furthermore, for both disciplines, the
lack of ‘‘negative’’ studies (showing no effects) are usually judged
to be of lesser value either by the investigator seeking a new
finding or a journal editor requiring impactful research. Such
evidence rarely appears in the literature.
One area that continues to plague both toxicology and
epidemiology is measurement of quality. Whereas poor and
excellent studies can often be identified and categorized, there is
no consistent and agreed method for those that fall in between
poor and excellent. For example, the Strobe statement (von Elm
et al., 2007) details criteria for judging the quality and reliability
of epidemiology studies, but the method is not routinely used or
cited with studies or reviews. In experimental biology, the criteria
for quality are less well defined and are often the product of where
the work was done and where it was published.
Another area that will need debate and refinement is the
degree of detail one needs to complete the two-dimensional
grid proposed in the Epid-Tox Framework. It may be
sufficient to declare general degrees of confidence in the
scaling of the two axes. However, with more precise scaling,
one could imagine dividing the grid into four quadrants,
with four quadrants within each quadrant, thereby subdivid-
ing and giving greater granularity to the overall conclu-
sions. This may add greater detail to the analysis but may
also spark fruitless debates about precisely where the
biological plausibility or epidemiological point should be
on each axis.
Nonetheless, a framework can provide the logic and
disciplined thinking that promotes open discourse and leads
to evidenced-based decisions. Furthermore, decisions about
what epidemiological or toxicological study should be done
can be facilitated by using the framework. For example,
clear indications from animal studies for a particular effect
should inform the data collected in an epidemiology study.
Likewise, epidemiological findings should spur the design of
in silico, in vitro, or in vivo studies that could corroborate
observations in human populations. Important decisions
about human safety should rely on the cohesive appreciation
of both epidemiology and toxicology and the synergistic
FIG. 7. Schematic representation of the framework for causal inference based upon weight of evidence of animal and epidemiological data.
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value that their combination brings to a comprehensive
evaluation.
The refinement of any method occurs by working
examples through it In order to take that first step toward
refinement, Simpkins et al. (2011) provides a case study that
utilizes the framework to collect, evaluate, and integrate
epidemiological and toxicological evidence for causal
inference. Hopefully, more environmental agents will be
worked through the Epid-Tox Framework to test and
improve its utility.
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